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Abstract
This study develops an overlapping generations model with human capital accumulation and
endogenous labor supply of the old to examine the effects of an old agent’s labor productivity on
labor supply, educational investments, and economic growth. We present a unique existence of the
balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium and find that a rise in an old agent’s labor productivity
induces more labor supply of the old. Moreover, the growth rate at the BGP equilibrium is hump-
shaped in an old agent’s labor productivity. As an old agent’s labor productivity grows, this growth
rate first increases then decreases, which implies that there is no clear negative relationship between
an old agent’s labor productivity and economic growth.
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1 Introduction
Many developed countries are facing the rapid aging of their population. Some believe that the rapid
aging will slow down economic growth, because older workers’ labor productivity is low relative to
young workers (see, for instance, Gordon (2016)). This paper, however, proposes that this argument
may not hold, even in a standard endogenous growth model.
This study develops a two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model in which both physical cap-
ital accumulation and human capital accumulation are growth engines and labor supply of the old is
endogenized. Labor supply of the old in the model can be interpreted as their retirement age. The pro-
duction function in the model shows constant-returns-to-scale in physical capital and human capital. A
young agent is endowed with human capital, but can choose how much she wants to invest in education.
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Agents inelastically supply one unit of labor to work in order to earn a wage income. When agents be-
come old, their wage depends on their human capital and labor productivity in old age. Agents can also
decide how much of their time they wish to devote to working when they are old. Under this setting, we
investigate how labor productivity of an old agent relative to a young agent affects the labor supply of
the old and economic growth.
The main finding is that the economic growth rate can increase if the labor productivity of the old
decreases. Why does this happen? High labor productivity of an old agent induces more educational
investment when people are young because it will increase labor income in old age. At the same time,
high labor productivity of an old agent raises wage income. Thus, the income effect reduces the labor
supply of the old, while the substitution effect increases it. In the model, because the substitution effect
dominates the income effect, an old agent supplies more labor as their labor productivity increases. This
increases the aggregate effective units of labor, which decreases wage rate. Since educational investment
by a young agent is a normal good, this makes a young agent to invest less in education. Specifically,
when an old agent’s labor productivity is too high, a young agent finds it optimal to invest less in ed-
ucation. The growth rate at the BGP equilibrium then decreases as an old agent’s labor productivity
rises. On the other hand, when an old agent’s labor productivity is low, a young agent finds it optimal to
invest more in education. The growth rate at the BGP equilibrium then increases as an old agent’s labor
productivity rises. Thus, the growth rate at the BGP equilibrium is hump-shaped in an old agent’s labor
productivity.
One related work to this paper is Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017). They also raise doubts about the
negative relationship between aging populations and economic growth. It was shown that there is no clear
negative relationship between aging and economic growth rate in the post-1990 era. The explanation
given for this is the endogenous response of technology. If aging is defined by the ratio of old workers to
young workers in the model, this paper shows that aging and economic growth rate are positively related
when labor productivity of the old is low. The cause for this result is educational investment in young
age, which is a different driving force from that in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017).
Another related work to this paper is Kunze (2014), who develops an OLGmodel with human capital
accumulation and finds a hump-shaped relationship between retirement age and economic growth. We
note that the analysis by Kunze (2014) is based on a model in which retirement age is exogenous.
Therefore, our paper complements the literature by analyzing the effects of retirement age on economic
growth by considering an alternative setting of retirement age.
Most studies related to retirement age are interested in the effects of retirement age on pension ben-
efits. Michel and Pestieau (2013) and Miyazaki (2014, 2016) study retirement age and optimal pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) social security policy.1 Chen and Miyazaki (2018) and Chen (2018) introduce fertility
into this strand of the literature and examine the effects of retirement age and fertility on PAYG pensions.2
Since retirement age can be either determined by law (mandatory retirement age) or optimally decided
by individuals, one would like to know how these two settings of retirement age influence economic
growth. While mandatory retirement age is considered in Miyazaki (2014), endogenous retirement age
is examined in Miyazaki (2019). Moreover, the effects of both exogenous and endogenous retirement
age are studied by Michel and Pestieau (2013), Chen and Miyazaki (2018), and Chen (2018).
1While Michel and Pestieau (2013) show that the first-best allocation cannot be achieved in a decentralized economy,
Miyazaki (2019) argues that the first-best allocation can be achieved in such an economy.
2While fertility is endogenized in Chen and Miyazaki (2018), it is exogenous in Chen (2018).
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model with endoge-
nous retirement time. Section 3 characterizes the BGP equilibrium and derives the growth rate along the
BGP equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effects of an old agent’s labor productivity on retirement age
and the long-run economic growth rate. Section 5 discusses how our results will change if we consider
different settings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and continues forever; t = 1,2, . . . . A population grows at rate n>−1, and assume that
the population of the initial old is L0 = 1. An agent lives for two periods: young, and old. A young agent
in period t supplies ht efficiency units of labor. The agent receives the market wage, wt , spends it on
consumption, ct , private education, et , and savings, st . Thus, a young agent’s budget constraint in period
t is
ct + et + st = wtht . (1)
If a young agent spends et for human capital accumulation in period t, her human capital in period t+1
will be
ht+1 = θe
η
t h
1−η
t , (2)
where θ > 0 and η ∈ (0,1).
A young agent in period t becomes old in period t + 1. The agent receives the return on savings,
Rt+1st . In addition, the agent supplies χlt+1ht+1 efficiency units of labor, and receives the market wage,
wt+1, where χ is an old agent’s labor productivity relative to a young agent and lt+1 ∈ [0,1]. The agent
spends all of her income on consumption, dt+1. Thus, the budget constraint in period t+1 is
dt+1 = wt+1ht+1χlt+1+Rt+1st . (3)
Combining Equations (1) and (3), an agent’s lifetime budget constraint is
ct + et +
dt+1
Rt+1
= wtht +
wt+1ht+1χlt+1
Rt+1
. (4)
Notice that the aggregate supply of capital is Kt+1 = Ntst and the aggregate supply of effective units of
labor is Ht+1 = Nt+1h
young
t+1 +Ntχlt+1h
old
t+1 = Nt(1+n+χlt+1)ht+1, where ht+1 = h
young
t+1 = h
old
t+1.
An agent derives utility from consumption when she is young, and from consumption and leisure
when she is old. Hence, an agent’s lifetime utility is expressed by
U(ct ,dt+1, lt+1) := ln(ct)+β ln(dt+1)+ γ ln(1− lt+1), (5)
where β > 0 and γ > 0 stand for the preference strength relative to the consumption when the agent is
young.
Assume for simplicity that the population in this economy is constant over time and is normalized to
be 1.
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There is a representative firm in the economy. Its production function is expressed as
Yt = AK
α
t H
1−α
t ,
where α ∈ (0,1), and Kt and Ht are the aggregate capital stock and aggregate effective units of labor in
the economy, respectively. Given the real wage, wt , and the real rental rate of capital, rt , the firm’s profit
in period t is
AKαt H
1−α
t −RtKt −wtHt .
Assume that capital is fully depreciated after production. Let kt :=Kt/Ht denote capital per effective unit
of labor in period t. Then, from the firm’s problem, we derive the return of physical capital and wage
rate as follows:
Rt = Aαk
α−1
t ,
wt = A(1−α)k
α
t .
The equilibrium concept is a standard perfect foresight competitive equilibrium. A balanced-growth
path (BGP) equilibrium is an equilibrium such that for some g = ht+1
ht
> 0, Yt+1
Yt
= Kt+1
Kt
= Ct+1
Ct
= Dt+1
Dt
=
Ht+1
Ht
= (1+n)g for all t, whereC andD are aggregate consumption of the young and the old, respectively.
If an old agent’s labor productivity is too low, then she will not supply her labor to the market. Then,
no young agent invests human capital, which implies et = 0 for all t. If so, then an economy does not
grow at all, and an equilibrium does not exist. To avoid non-existence of equilibrium, we impose the
following assumption on χ throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.1. χ satisfies
χ > (1+n)
α
1−α
γ
β
.
3 Characterizing the equilibrium
The first-order conditions to an agent’s problem induce
dt+1 = βRt+1ct , (6)
γRt+1ct = wt+1χht+1(1− lt+1), (7)
Rt+1 = wt+1lt+1χθηe
η−1
t h
1−η
t . (8)
From Equation (7),
wt+1χht+1lt+1 = wt+1χht+1− γRt+1ct (9)
holds. Combining Equation (9) with Equation (8),
Rt+1et = wt+1lt+1χηht+1 = η(wt+1χht+1− γRt+1ct)⇒ et =
ηwt+1χht+1
Rt+1
−ηγct . (10)
From Equations (4), (6), (9), and (10),
ct =
1
1+β + γ(1−η)
[
wtht +
(1−η)wt+1χht+1
Rt+1
]
. (11)
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Since st = wtht − ct − et , we have
st =
β + γ
1+β + γ(1−η)
wtht −
wt+1χht+1
Rt+1
1+ηβ
1+β + γ(1−η)
. (12)
Using Equation (12), we obtain
kt+1 =
Ntst
Ntht+1(1+n+χlt+1)
=
β + γ
1+β + γ(1−η)
A(1−α)kαt
ht
ht+1
1
1+n+ lt+1χ
−
1+ηβ
1+β + γ(1−η)
χ
1+n+ lt+1χ
1−α
α
kt+1,
where we use wt = A(1−α)k
α
t and Rt = Aαk
α−1
t . Rearranging this equation, we have
kt+1
[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n+ lt+1χ)α +(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)
α
= (β + γ)
ht
ht+1
A(1−α)kαt (13)
From Equations (9) and (11),
1+n+ lt+1χ = 1+n+
(1+β )χ
1+β + γ(1−η)
−
γ
1+β + γ(1−η)
α
1−α
1
kt+1
A(1−α)kαt
ht
ht+1
. (14)
Plugging Equation (14) into Equation (13), we have
kt+1
ht+1
ht
=
[β (1−α)+ γ]A
[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+(1+β )χ + (1+ηβ )χ(1−α)α
kαt . (15)
From Equations (14) and (15),
lt+1χ =
(1−α)β χ−αγ(1+n)
β (1−α)+ γ
. (16)
Note that under Assumption 1, lt+1 > 0 for all t.
Combining Equation (11) with Equation (10),
et =
η(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
wt+1χht+1
Rt+1
−
ηγ
1+β + γ(1−η)
wtht . (17)
Then,
ht+1
ht
= θ
(
et
ht
)η
= θ
(
1−α
α
χkt+1
ht+1
ht
η(1+β )
1+β + γ(1−η)
−
ηγ
1+β + γ(1−η)
A(1−α)kαt
)η
. (18)
From Equations (18) and (15), we obtain
kt+1 =
αA[β (1−α)+ γ]
θ{α[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ +(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)}1−η
×
1
{(1−α)ηA[χ(1−α)β −αγ(1+n)]}η
× k
α(1−η)
t . (19)
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From Equation (19), there is a unique stationary point, k∗,
k∗ :=
[
αA[β (1−α)+γ]
θ{α[1+β+γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ+(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)}1−η
× 1{(1−α)ηA[χ(1−α)β−αγ(1+n)]}η
] 1
1−α(1−η)
.
In the BGP equilibrium, the growth factor of the economy is
g =
ht+1
ht
=
[β (1−α)+ γ]A
[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+(1+β )χ + (1+ηβ )χ(1−α)α
(k∗)α
k∗
= θ
1−α
1−α(1−η)
[
A{α[β (1−α)+ γ]}α {(1−α)η [χ(1−α)β −αγ(1+n)]}1−α
α[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ +(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)
] η
1−α(1−η)
.
Lemma 3.1. There is a unique BGP equilibrium in this model.
4 Results
In this section, we examine how an old agent’s labor productivity, χ , affects an old agent’s labor supply
and economic growth rate.
Proposition 4.1. In the BGP equilibrium, an old agent supplies more labor if χ increases.
Proof. From Equation (16),
lt+1 =
(1−α)β
β (1−α)+ γ
−
αγ(1+n)
χ[β (1−α)+ γ]
.
If χ increases, then the second term decreases. Thus, lt+1 increases. Q.E.D.
High labor productivity of an old agent raises wage income, which decreases labor supply due to
the income effect. However, the substitution effect increases labor supply of the old. This proposition
shows that the substitution effect dominates the income effect.Note also that labor supply of the old is
decreasing in population growth rate. Thus, recent population aging caused by low population growth
rate in many developed countries will make old people to work longer, or retire later.
Proposition 4.2. In the BGP equilibrium, the growth factor of the economy, g, satisfies
∂g
∂ χ


>
=
<

0 if χ


<
=
>

χ := (1+n)
{
(1−α)[1+β + γ(1−η)]
α(1+β )+(1+ηβ )(1−α)
+
γ
(1−α)β
}
. (20)
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.2 shows that the economic growth rate in the BGP equilibrium is hump-shaped in χ .
An increase in χ makes a young agent invest more in her human capital, that is, et increases. At the
same time, an old agent supplies more labor as χ increases. This increases the aggregate effective units
of labor. This decreases the wage rate, which makes a young agent to invest less in education. If the
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first effect dominates the second effect, then an increase in χ increases g. Otherwise, an increase in χ
decreases g. Proposition 4.2 states that when χ is small, the first effect dominates the second effect,
and as χ becomes larger, the second effect starts dominating the first effect. This suggests that even
when an old agent’s labor productivity is low, the economic growth rate can be higher than when an old
agent’s labor productivity is high. Note that g, decreases as n increases. Since χ is increasing in n, as the
population ages, low old people’s labor productivity would be preferred to achieve higher growth of per
capita consumption for the young and the old.
From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, when χ is not so high, a positive relationship between aging and
economic growth rate can be observed if aging is defined by the ratio of old workers to young workers,
that is, lt+1 in this model. On the other hand, when χ is high, a negative relationship between aging and
economic growth rate can be observed. This suggests that varying labor productivity of the old might be
a factor that determines the relationship between aging and economic growth.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how our results will change if we consider a different setting.
5.1 A CRRA utility function
The first case is that what happens if we consider a more general utility function such as a CRRA utility
function.
Since a young agent’s consumption is not important when we consider growth, consider the following
modified young agent’s problem:
maxet ,st ,dt+1,lt+1 β
d1−εt+1
1− ε
+ γ
(1− lt+1)
1−µ
1−µ
s.t. et +
dt+1
Rt+1
= wtht +
wt+1ht+1χlt+1
Rt+1
,
ht+1 = θe
η
t h
1−η
t .
The first-order conditions are:
γ(1− lt+t1)
−µ = βd−εt+1wt+1θe
η
t h
1−η
t χ
et =
[
wt+1θηχ lt+1
Rt+1
] 1
1−η
ht
et +
dt+1
Rt+1
= wtht +
wt+1θe
η
t h
1−η
t χlt+1
Rt+1
.
From these equations, we obtain
1
Rt+1

βw
1
1−η
t+1 θ
1
1−η ht
γ
(
1
Rt+1
) η
1−η
(1− lt+1)
µ l
η
1−η
t+1


1
ε
=
wtht
χ
1
(1−η)ε
+
[
wt+1θ lt+1
Rt+1
] 1
1−η
htη
η
1−η χ
ε−1
(1−η)ε . (21)
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When we use a natural-log utility function, Equation (21) holds with ε = µ = 1. This implies that a
change in χ does not change the value of the second term in the RHS of Equation (21). When ε > 1, a
change in χ changes both terms in the RHS of Equation (21). Thus, a change in χ may decrease l for
some parameter values, which implies Proposition 4.1 does not necessarily holds if the utility function is
a CRRA function.
5.2 An elastic labor supply of a young agent
Next is to consider a case in which a young agent elastically supplies his/her labor. Consider the follow-
ing modified young agent’s problem:
maxet ,st ,dt+1,lt+1 σ ln(1− l
y
t )+β ln(dt+1)+ γ ln(1− lt+1)
s.t. et +
dt+1
Rt+1
= wtht l
y
t +
wt+1ht+1χlt+1
Rt+1
,
ht+1 = θe
η
t h
1−η
t ,
where l
y
t and l
o
t+1 are labor supply of a young agent and that of an old agent, respectively.
The first-order conditions are
wtht(1− l
y
t ) =
σdt+1
βRt+1
,
wt+1ht+1χ(1− l
o
t+1) =
γ
β
dt+1,
wt+1θηe
η−1
t h
1−η
t l
o
t+1χ = Rt+1.
Combining them into the lifetime budget constraint, we obtain
dt+1 =
βRt+1
β +σ + γ(1−η)
[
wtht +
wt+1ht+1χ(1−η)
Rt+1
]
.
From this equation,
l
y
t = 1−
σ
wtht [γ(1−η)+β +σ ]
[
wtht +
wt+1ht+1χ(1−η)
Rt+1
]
,
and
lot+1 = 1−
γRt+1
wt+1ht+1χ[γ(1−η)+β +σ ]
[
wtht +
wt+1ht+1χ(1−η)
Rt+1
]
.
σ = 0 corresponds to the case we studied in the paper. In this setting, it seems true that a young agent’s
labor supply decreases as χ increases. When a young agent inelastically supplies his/her labor in the
original model, an increase in χ increases an old agent’s labor supply. Since an increase in χ decreases a
young agent’s labor supply, it is probable that an increase in χ also increases an old agent’s labor supply
in this case to compensate a decrease of effective labor. This may not hold if we consider a CRRA utility
function.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies a two-period OLGmodel in which both physical capital stock and human capital stock
are growth engines and an old agent endogenously chooses her labor supply. We characterize a unique
BGP equilibrium and investigate the effect of an old agent’s labor productivity on labor supply and on
economic growth. We show that labor supply of the old will increase as an old agent’s labor productivity
becomes greater, and that the economic growth rate is hump-shaped in an old agent’s labor productivity.
Although some might expect a negative effect from an aging population on economic growth due to low
labor productivity of the old, this paper’s findings show that this pessimistic view is not necessarily true.
A Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. The sign of
∂g
∂ χ is determined by that of the derivative ofG :=
[χ(1−α)β−αγ(1+n)]1−α
α[1+β+γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ+(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)
with respect to χ . Taking the derivative of G with respect to χ , we have
∂G
∂ χ
=
(1−α)[χ(1−α)β −αγ(1+n)]−α(1−α)β
α[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ +(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)
−
[χ(1−α)β −αγ(1+n)]1−α [α(1+β )+(1+ηβ )(1−α)]
{α[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ +(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)}2
=
[χ(1−α)β −αγ(1+n)]−αα
{α[1+β + γ(1−η)](1+n)+α(1+β )χ +(1+ηβ )χ(1−α)}2
×
{
−(1−α)β [α(1+β )+(1+ηβ )(1−α)]χ
+(1−α)2β [(1+β )+ γ(1−η)](1+n)+ γ[α(1+β )+(1+ηβ )(1−α)](1+n)
}
.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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